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thanks to the seminal work of Samuel Preston (1975) , demographers for many years have, instead, viewed the life expectancy differences between rich and poor countries in Figure 1 as the outcome of two component factors-the first, a movement along a given e 0 /GdP function, reflecting the positive impact of improved living levels attributable to economic growth (the Pritchett-Summers effect); and the second, an upward shift in the function, the result of advances in health knowledge and technology, whose application leads to increased life expectancy at given levels of GdP per capita. Preston's empirical analysis identified the principal cause of life expectancy improvement post-1900 as the upward shift of the function; indeed, advances in health technology were estimated to account for 75 to 90 percent of the overall improvement.
unlike the common "black box" treatment of production technology in economics, Preston offered numerous specific examples of advances in health technology. other scholars have provided similar evidence (e.g., durand 1960; easterlin 2004, chapter 7; Cutler, deaton, and lleras-muney 2006 and the references therein). the major breakthroughs in health technology occurred roughly in three stages. the first was new methods of preventing the transmission of disease, starting around the middle of the nineteenth century. the so-called sanitation revolution at that time aimed at cleaning up cities through purer water supplies, better sewage disposal, paved streets, education in personal hygiene, and the like. the second stage, starting around the 1890s, was the introduction of vaccines aimed at preventing certain infectious diseases. the third, beginning in the late 1930s, was the development of new drugs (antimicrobials) to cure infectious disease. these advances, it should be noted, are quite different from the new technologies of the "industrial revolutions" responsible for the growth of GdP per capita (cf. easterlin 1996) . a case could be made that all of the observed improvement in life expectancy is the result of advances in health technology. Preston's 10 to 25 percent share of causality allotted to higher GdP per capita is based on a positively sloped e 0 /GdP function. But if one were to go back to the midnineteenth century, before the major breakthroughs in health knowledge and technology mentioned above, it is by no means clear that the slope of the function was positive at that time. true, higher GdP per capita led to better food, clothing, and (perhaps) shelter, hence more resistance to disease. Counteracting this trend, however, was the fact that higher GdP per capita also led to increased urban concentration and consequently greater exposure to disease. the reaction of the nineteenth-century economist nassau Senior to the horrifying descriptions of Britain's "great towns" in the 1838 Poor law reports tells the story:
what other result [besides high urban mortality] can be expected, when any man who can purchase or hire a plot of ground is allowed to cover it with such buildings as he may think fit, where there is no power to enforce drainage or sewerage, or to regulate the width of the streets, or to prevent houses from being packed back to back, and separated in front by mere alleys and courts, or their being filled with as many inmates as their walls can contain, or the accumulation within and without, of all the impurities which arise in a crowded population? (as quoted in Flinn 1965) it seems plausible that the positive slope of Preston's e 0 /GdP function was itself the product of new knowledge, because sanitary reform and similar advances gradually eliminated the sizable excess of urban over rural mortality. thus, the negative effect on life expectancy that growing GdP per capita induced via increased urban concentration of the population was removed, leaving only the positive effect of improved living standards.
By this reasoning, all of the modern improvement in life expectancy is due to advances in health technology, not to higher GdP per capita. But if this is so, how can one account for the positive association of life expectancy and GdP per capita in Figure 1? one argument is that the higher income resulting from modern economic growth is essential to financing increased private and government expenditures associated with improved health technology. But the measures necessary to implement advances in health technology do not seem to have required, on average, particularly high levels of income. if they did, then less developed countries (ldCs) would have been hard put to implement public health programs in the twentieth century without substantial external aid. in fact, such aid was trivial; an assessment published in 1980 concluded that "total external health aid received by ldCs is less than 3% of their total health expenditures" (Preston 1980) . Clearly, despite their low levels of income, ldCs were able almost entirely on their own to fund applications of new health technology. Higher GdP per capita was not essential to implement these advances.
an alternative explanation-what might be called the "head start hypothesis"-is suggested here for the significant positive cross-section association between life expectancy and GdP per capita. assume that the historical trajectories of GdP per capita and life expectancy are independent of each other and that each is governed by advances in its own underlying technology. in the case of GdP per capita, call it "production technology"; in the case of life expectancy, "health technology" (cf. easterlin 1996) . assume also that the initial levels of GdP per capita and life expectancy are low and fairly similar among countries, and that the takeoff dates for advances in production technology and health technology in different countries may differ from each other. Suppose that the countries with a head start in production technology and thus in the growth of GdP per capita are the same as those with a head start in health technology, and thus in the improvement of life expectancy. then the result will be that at any given date the head start countries will have both higher GdP per capita and higher life expectancy than the countries that followed, even though GdP and life expectancy have no causal relation to each other. the positive cross-section relationship between life expectancy and GdP per capita is the result of the same countries having a head start in the technology underlying each variable.
to illustrate numerically, consider the takeoff dates in economic growth and life expectancy improvement (reflecting, respectively, the introduction of modern production technology and health technology) listed for each of the three regions in table 1 (columns 1 and 2). although not precise, the dates are roughly in keeping with historical experience. western europe (and its overseas descendants) leads the way in both technologies, and sub-Saharan african brings up the rear. if one calculates years since takeoff in both life expectancy and GdP per capita, western europe has the greatest number of years and sub-Saharan africa the fewest (columns 3 and 4). if one then plots years since takeoff for the three regions, as is done in Figure 2 , we reproduce the positive slope of the regression line in Figure 1 . the interpretation of Figure 1 suggested by Figure 2 is that western europe has the highest life expectancy and GdP per capita because it had a substantial head start in the implementation of both economic and health technologies. Correspondingly, sub-Saharan africa has the lowest life expectancy and GdP per capita because it was the last to implement both technologies. the high values on life expectancy and GdP per capita for western europe and the low values for sub-Saharan africa do not indicate a causal relation-by assumption they are independent of each other. they simply indicate that western europe was the leader in both technologies, and sub-Saharan africa was a follower. although the timing and rate of spread differs between the two technologies, the geographic pattern of diffusion is the same, and the result is a statistically significant international cross-section. Western Europe in life expectancy) is marked by the same leader-follower sequence, with western european countries and their overseas descendants in the vanguard and sub-Saharan africa bringing up the rear. the result is that any pointof-time comparison of countries in recent decades will show a significant positive relation between life expectancy and GdP per capita, with western europe and its descendants high on both variables and sub-Saharan africa low. although some analysts take this association as support for a causal connection running from economic growth to life expectancy, this inference is belied by two empirical observations. the first is the substantial difference in the timing of the onset of each phenomenon. while the industrial revolution dates from the early nineteenth century, the mortality revolution does not take off until over half a century later. the second is the marked difference in the rapidity of spread of the two revolutions. although the mortality revolution starts later, it spreads much faster. By the latter part of the twentieth century, the mortality revolution had clearly reached sub-Saharan africa; whether the industrial revolution has taken hold there yet remains arguable. these empirical observations suggest that each revolution must be analyzed in its own right in order to understand its underlying causes and spread. the presumption based on international cross-section regressions that growth is the motive force-that "wealthier is healthier"-is misleading. Cross-section regressions merely record that one set of countries got an early start on both revolutions and another set, a late start. these conclusions, illustrated here for the industrial and mortality revolutions, are more generally applicable. in the past several centuries, western europe has been in the forefront of a number of revolutionary changes-the development of universal schooling, the rise of political democracy, the adoption of deliberate fertility control and consequent decline in childbearing, the empowerment of women, the welfare state, and so forth. each of these is characterized by a particular pattern of onset and spread. For example, while the expansion of public schooling and the rise of political democracy both antedate by different lengths of time the onset of modern economic growth, universal primary schooling is today widespread throughout the world, while the diffusion of political democracy remains quite limited. understanding these patterns calls for much more than simple cross-section regressions.
there remains, of course, the question why western europe in recent centuries has been the birthplace of what are viewed by many as major advances in the human condition. a plausible starting point is the scientific revolution. the new empirical and experimental mode of inquiry it initiated became the key to systematic knowledge of the natural world and, in time, the social world as well. the benefits of this knowledge have resulted in unprecedented improvements in human well-being, the evidence for which is documented, but not explained, by cross-section regressions.
